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Buying and selling implies fi nancial nego-
tiation between recipient (buyer) and 
donor (seller), suggests higher or lower 
prices in the face of variations in value 
and quality, may involve brokers and mid-
dlemen, and so on. Certainly this is not 
desirable. We need a government-regu-
lated, scrupulously supervised program in 
which a person or his or her estate receives 
a fi xed valuable enhancement or reward 
for organ donation. No less a personage 
than Paul Terasaki suggested that donors 
be rewarded with a valuable gold medal — 
the implication being that it could be kept 
or sold according to the donor’s wishes.8 
I envision a scheme in which a govern-
ment insurance trust fund is established 
and administered by a federal agency or 
commission. A fixed-amount specific 
reward or honorarium for organ donation 
would be provided to living organ donors 
or to benefi ciaries of estates of deceased 
donors. Th e reward would be disbursed by 
the federal agency in essentially the same 
manner as the payment of an insurance 
policy. Payment would be implemented 
aft er notifi cation and certifi cation of the 
donation by accredited transplant pro-
grams, and confi rmation of the donation 
by the United Network for Organ Sharing 
or government health agencies. Again it 
must be emphasized that this would not 
be the buying or selling of organs; it would 
be a specific, fixed-amount reward for 
organ donation. Interestingly, a reward 
of $40,000 to $80,000 has been suggested 
as financially feasible,9,10 with enough 
savings possibly generated by reduced 
dialysis costs to make the system self-
sustaining. Obviously, this very limited 
description of this concept is an extreme 
simplifi cation of what would be a complex 
system necessary to assure accurate and 
honest implementation of rewards that 
should encourage both living-donor and 
deceased-donor organ donation.
One fi nal note: Th ere is concern in both 
major American political parties that any 
government effort to pay rewards for 
organ donation could be interpreted as 
advocating a policy that is directly exploit-
ive of the poor. Th ere is obvious reluctance 
to take a strong leadership role in this 
eff ort on the part of both parties. Th e gov-
ernment should establish a nonpartisan 
federal commission to study all aspects of 
the organ shortage and recommend ways 
to remedy it, with particular emphasis on 
a system to provide fi nancial and/or other 
types of valuable rewards for organ dona-
tion. Establishment of such a nonpartisan 
commission would be a critically impor-
tant initial step in seeking a solution to 
this vexing problem of shortage of solid 
organs for transplantation.
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Voluntary reciprocal altruism: 
a novel strategy to encourage 
deceased organ donation
DW Landry1
New strategies are needed to encourage organ donation. Altruism, the 
impulse that underlies our present system, is undermined by proposals 
that provide tangible inducements to improve donation which are, 
in their own subtle ways, coercive. I propose a new strategy based on 
implementing an option to donate that reinforces the strong reciprocity 
which drives anonymous altruism.
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Th e Friedmans’ proposal1 (this issue) to 
pay for deceased organs underscores the 
failure of the current system to provide 
adequate numbers of donations.
Delmonico’s critique2 (this issue) con-
cludes with an argument for public health 
initiatives to reduce the demand for dona-
tions, but he too seeks new strategies to 
increase supply and favors incentives as 
long as they are ethical.3 Th e ethics and 
eff ectiveness of incentives to next of kin, 
such as priority points should any need a 
transplant, are subject to debate. Th e most 
benign of the ethical incentives — a gold 
medal commemorating the donation — is 
unobjectionable, but this inducement is 
also unlikely to be compelling for many. 
Another approach would increase the 
donor pool by presuming consent unless 
it is actively revoked by the prospec-
tive donor, but this is vastly unpopular, 
because it is seen as coercive and failing 
to respect the individual.4
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Clearly, we need to develop a new strat-
egy to encourage the donation of deceased 
organs. Many factors must be considered 
in the design of such a strategy, but I 
would emphasize the following few.
Donor over next of kin
The prospective donor must be the 
focus of the strategy, not the next of kin. 
Although donation must be assented 
to by the next of kin, whether they do 
assent depends critically on whether 
the donor ever expressed the preference 
to donate.5 Th us, the successful strategy 
must persuade potential donors to state a 
preference for donation. Eff ective imple-
mentation requires public policy consider-
ation of donor awareness and recognition 
of donor status. A national campaign to 
publicize the problem of inadequate organ 
donation and to promulgate the details 
of a new system would promote donor 
participation and assent of next of kin. A 
uniform standard for recognizing donor 
status could be achieved through a federal 
standard for the current declaration on the 
driver’s licenses of some states.
Self-interest over disinterest
Th e strategy must engage the self-inter-
est of the prospective donor in order to 
overcome the natural reluctance to face 
one’s mortality. A signifi cant eff ort may be 
required to overcome paranoia about the 
possibility of a premature harvesting of 
organs or to transcend squeamishness at 
the thought of personal dissection. Even 
altruistic decisions, which by defi nition 
are without direct reward, must be rein-
forced by some personal utility — a sub-
jective preference shaped by the possibility 
of reward or the risk of punishment — if 
they are to reoccur reproducibly in large 
populations. But, beyond the absence of 
tangible consequence, organ donation 
provides scant psychological or spiritual 
reward for most, and the utility curves are 
skewed far from donation. An eff ective 
system must engage self-interest to create 
a new bias in favor of donation.
Virtue from self-interest
The strategy must yield a structure in 
which the pursuit of self-interest leads to 
just results. Th e obvious injustice in the 
current system falls on recipients who 
languish on waiting lists while organs are 
discarded that could have been donated, 
and this will be redressed if the strategy 
eff ectively increases donation. Another 
is embodied in the lack of fairness of the 
many recipients who at one time refused 
to agree to donate but now receive organs 
ahead of those who bore the burden of 
agreeing. John Rawls’s A Th eory of Justice 
provides criteria for evaluating institu-
tions and social structures for the extent 
to which they promote justice as fairness.6 
His simple exposition on “perfect proce-
dural justice” illustrates how an ideal sys-
tem reinforces justice: If two people agree 
to divide a pie evenly and the one who 
cuts chooses his or her piece, fairness will 
depend on good will overcoming self-
interest; in contrast, the system in which 
one cuts and the other chooses will always 
give a just result, because self-interest is 
aligned with a fair outcome. Th e result 
is just, not despite but especially because 
of each party’s pursuit of his or her own 
self-interest. Th e strategy for promoting 
donations must align the self-interest of 
the prospective donor with the fair and 
just decision to agree to donate.
Reciprocity despite anonymity
The possibility of reciprocity must be 
emphasized despite the anonymous rela-
tionship of donor and recipient. Organ 
donation is the quintessential charitable 
act, a literal ‘gift of self ’. The altruistic 
impulse must be reinforced not under-
mined by compensation. But what then 
can be given? EO Wilson’s Sociobiology 
provides an insight.7 Altruism can be 
conceived as an adaptive strategy that 
is reinforced the greater the possibility 
of reciprocity. Altruism, if supported by 
“strong reciprocity” that incorporates a 
propensity to reward altruists and pun-
ish the violators of altruistic norms,8 can 
operate anonymously in social structures 
to favor cooperation. Reciprocity must be 
highlighted in the strategy and an element 
of strong reciprocity incorporated.
Flexibility over efficiency
A strategy involving persons that regards 
effi  ciency as the sole good to be optimized 
devalues the individual and affronts 
human dignity. Th e strategy should not 
be coercive or exclusive. It must incorpo-
rate fl exibility. For example, participation 
in any novel element must be voluntary. 
Participants must be able to change their 
minds without undue penalty.
But can these sometimes conflicting 
considerations be harmonized on the 
back of a driver’s license? I propose a syn-
thesis based on providing an option that 
reinforces the strong reciprocity that bol-
sters anonymous altruism. Th e resulting 
strategy, voluntary reciprocal altruism, is 
embodied in two questions:
(1)  I would want an organ transplant 
to save my life. Check one:
yes
no
(2)  In the event of my death, I agree to 
the donation of my organs. Check 
one:
yes 
no   
 yes, with a preference to 
donate to those who agree 
to donate their organs
Th e fi rst resolution in one stroke moves 
the issue of reciprocity front and center: to 
do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you. Th is resolution is non-binding 
but is designed to arouse the conscience.
Th e second resolution raises a doubt 
in the mind of the respondent: Is there 
a penalty for choosing “no” (selfi shness) 
rather than the unqualifi ed “yes” (altru-
ism) or the qualifi ed “yes, but recipro-
cally” (strong reciprocity)? And there is 
a penalty for a negative response: in the 
event that the “no” responder needs an 
organ, perhaps the strong reciprocators 
will have restricted enough of their organs 
to aff ect adversely  the possibility of trans-
plantation. Conversely, the unqualifi ed 
affi  rmative response obtains a reward in 
the form of access to a new pool of organs 
created by the strong reciprocators. Th e 
drive found in many for strong reciproc-
ity may by itself increase the numbers of 
donors, because “yes, but reciprocally” 
now becomes a mechanism to reward 
social cooperation and punish the viola-
tor of norms.  Game theory allows us to 
sketch utility curves, but a quantitative 
analysis is not needed to appreciate how 
self-interest biases the decision and shift s 
the preferences toward donation. The 
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novel element in the system, the third 
choice, is voluntary, and those who aspire 
to pure altruism can shun it.
Note that the preference accorded the 
recipient who is also an avowed donor 
need only tip the scales if the clinical pri-
ority for competing recipients is balanced. 
Th e subtlety of the preference is impor-
tant because giving an organ to a non-
critically ill avowed donor rather than a 
critically ill non-donor would off end the 
conscience as a violation of mercy. Also, 
generosity would extend the priority to 
all individuals without driver’s licenses, 
thereby covering minors, the elderly, and 
the profoundly impoverished.
Finally, the ill could participate in the 
program even if the likelihood that their 
organs would be accepted for transplant 
were vanishingly small. In fact, initially 
everyone on the recipient list would be eli-
gible to simply declare themselves donors 
to avoid exclusion. No one would want to 
be on the waiting list and not be eligible 
for additional organs. Someone who ini-
tially chose “no” for the second question 
could reconsider at any time and move to 
a “yes” category but with the stipulation 
that priority status would lag 5 years to 
avoid ‘sickbed conversions’. Th ose who fail 
to choose would be classifi ed, as now, as a 
“no,” and thus the 5-year lag in changing 
status would penalize procrastinators and 
encourage a timely decision.
Could such a simple paradigm really 
succeed?
An unscientifi c survey argues yes.
A sample of 115 first-year medical 
students were told that a new strategy 
to encourage donations was under con-
sideration. When question 1 as above (“I 
would want an organ transplant to save 
my life”) was presented, 100% responded 
yes; no one would decline transplantation 
in this population. When question 1 was 
followed by question 2 as above (“In the 
event of my death, I agree to the dona-
tion of my organs,” the total yes votes for 
question 2 rose to 94% (74% unqualifi ed 
yes, 20% yes but reciprocally, 2% no, 4% 
no decision). The baseline agreement 
to donate by this group was 59%. The 
increase in both unqualifi ed and qualifi ed 
affi  rmative responses suggests that volun-
tary reciprocal altruism could be a robust 
strategy to increase donations.
A pilot study is needed.
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